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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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DAILY BRIEF

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

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Republic of the Congo: Lumumba's 19 August statement that he is prepared to "renounce" the services of the UN troops in the Congo is his strongest implication to date that he may demand a complete UN withdrawal. Although Lumumba hinted that he had commitments of "unselfish" aid from unnamed countries, he did not repeat his earlier threat to take unilateral action against Katanga unless given satisfaction by the UN Security Council by 24 August.

Ambassador Timberlake has reported that anti-Lumumba elements in the Congo might attempt to overthrow the government by assassinating Lumumba or by attempting a coup. The

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25X1 [constitution requires that a motion in the Senate for a vote of no confidence be followed by a 48-hour waiting period. This would allow time for Lumumba to take what steps he felt necessary to prevent a quorum.] [redacted] 25X1

III. THE WEST

25X1 West Germany - France: West German Foreign Minister Brentano has told US Ambassador Dowling that Adenauer and he are seriously concerned regarding the plans of De Gaulle for a European confederation and revamping of NATO which are "quite opposed" to the views still held by Bonn. Although Adenauer feels he cannot directly oppose De Gaulle, he hopes to wear him down by demonstrating the impracticality of De Gaulle's plans. Brentano said Adenauer and De Gaulle do agree that the powers of the Common Market's executive should be reduced in favor of the council of the six national foreign ministers, but Dowling believes this "seeming retreat from integration" by Adenauer is only a tactical move. [redacted] 25X1

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LATE ITEMS

***Mali Federation:** The newly independent Mali Federation-- comprising the states of Senegal and Soudan--appears to have broken apart as a result of the vote of the National Assembly of Senegal on 19 August to withdraw from the federation and proclaim the independence of Senegal. Senegal's action raises the imminent threat of civil war, because Mali President Modibo Keita recently warned that secession was unconstitutional and would lead to bloodshed. The main differences concern foreign policy and the allocation of top administrative posts. 110

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The Situation in the Congo

Lumumba's statement on 19 August that he is prepared to "renounce" the services of UN troops in the Congo is his strongest implication to date that he may demand a complete withdrawal of UN forces. Lumumba charged that Hammarskjold had "betrayed the United Nations," alleging that the incident on 18 August in which Canadian officers were assaulted by Congolese police had been "blown out of proportion" by Hammarskjold in order to influence the forthcoming Security Council debate. Although Lumumba hinted that he had commitments of "unselfish" aid from certain countries, he did not repeat his earlier threat to take unilateral action against Katanga if the Security Council did not act by 24 August.

The Security Council is expected to begin debate on the UN role in the Congo on 21 August. An Indian delegate estimated on 18 August that African delegations will support the secretary general. Since then the incident involving the Canadians has stimulated criticism of Lumumba from a number of African contingents in the Congo. This will probably operate to Hammarskjold's advantage in the UN debate.

Ambassador Timberlake has reported that anti-Lumumba elements in the Congo might attempt to overthrow the government by assassinating Lumumba or by attempting a coup. If an attempt were made to oust the government by a vote of no confidence, the compulsory 48-hour waiting period would give Lumumba time to take strong-arm action to prevent a quorum. No single leader of anti-Lumumba forces has emerged, although the Senate was a focal point of anti-Lumumba sentiment in the early weeks following independence.

While current negotiations in Geneva between Belgium and the Congo on the division of assets of the Central Congo Bank and the protection of Ruanda-Urundi interests are reportedly going well, Belgians fear that Lumumba will refuse to implement the

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agreements reached there. Belgium probably will transfer exchange control powers to the Congo Government in Leopoldville this week, and the Congo finance minister probably will then issue a decree blocking all foreign currency transactions. It will then be impossible for the Belgian Government to pay Belgian technicians in the Congo outside Katanga, and most of them would leave rather than accept their salaries in nontransferable currency. This could result in greater confusion, as it is doubtful that the UN will be able to replace them effectively for some time to come.

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Adenauer's Differences With De Gaulle Over European
Integration and NATO

In a conversation with US Ambassador Dowling on 16 August, West German Foreign Minister Brentano declared that Chancellor Adenauer and he are "seriously concerned" over French President de Gaulle's plans for a European confederation and a revamping of NATO--plans which are "quite opposed" to the views still held by Bonn.

Brentano said De Gaulle seems even more set in his views than two years ago, and implied it was the chancellor's strategy to attempt to "wear De Gaulle down" by demonstrating the impracticality of his plans. Adenauer has accordingly written a personal letter to De Gaulle and has sent Deputy Foreign Minister van Scherpenberg to Paris to make clear that Bonn remains dedicated to the realization of European integration. While Brentano said that Adenauer and De Gaulle are substantially agreed on reducing the supranational powers of the Common Market's executive commission, Dowling believes this "seeming retreat from integration" is only tactical and is attributable in part to electoral pressures on the chancellor.

(Despite the fact that this tactical shift would seem to have brought Adenauer closer to De Gaulle's opposition to supranational institutions, Brentano's remarks tend to confirm earlier impressions that Bonn is not yet prepared to accept as an alternative a loose, French-dominated confederation with anti-British and possibly anti-NATO overtones. This reserve would account for Adenauer's friendly offer during Macmillan's visit to Bonn on 10-11 August to work out a long-range solution to the split between the Common Market and the British-led Outer Seven.

De Gaulle's plans, still not fully known, reportedly involve the creation of a council of heads of government of the six Common Market countries and three ministerial committees to coordinate political, defense, and cultural policies. No such

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(committee would be set up for economic affairs, which would be left in the institutional framework of the Common Market. This new structure would presumably be the basis for De Gaulle's proposed "revitalization" of NATO, which, according to Van Scherpenberg, De Gaulle wants to replace with an "alliance" of the US speaking for itself, Britain speaking for the Commonwealth, and France representing the Common Market.

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Situation in Mali Federation

The newly independent Federation of Mali, beset with growing friction between its component states of Senegal and Soudan, appears to be in the throes of dissolution and perhaps on the threshold of civil war. On 19 August the Senegalese National Assembly voted to withdraw from the federation and proclaim Senegal's independence. The immediate causes of the friction are differences over the allocation of top administrative posts. However, underlying cultural dissimilarities and opposing attitudes on foreign policy have led to growing suspicion and mistrust. Senegalese leaders such as Leopold Senghor and Mamadou Dia have urged a moderate, generally pro-French course of action, while the Soudanese, under the leadership of Modibo Keita, have favored a more extreme nationalist viewpoint.

Civil war may be imminent, in view of previous warnings by Modibo Keita, president of the Mali Council of Ministers, that there was no constitutional provision for secession and that any such effort would result in bloodshed. Keita has declared a state of emergency, and the cabinet has granted him security powers. He reportedly has moved troops into positions around government buildings in the federation's capital of Dakar and has discharged Senegalese Premier Mamadou Dia from his office as Mali vice president. In a speech to the Senegalese assembly, Dia accused Keita of attempting a coup and called on his countrymen to mobilize.

The landlocked Soudan is economically dependent on Senegal, although the Soudanese comprise 60 percent of Mali's population of 6,500,000. If the federal ties are severed, the Soudanese leaders may consider closer relations with neighboring Guinea, with which considerable political rapport has existed in the past.

Dissolution of the federation poses several problems for France. Mali is an independent member of the French Community, and Paris has both military and economic agreements with the

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federation, including defense installations at the modern port of Dakar. Furthermore, the influential French minority of about 50,000 at Dakar might become involved if civil war breaks out. A rupture of the federation may create international problems over recognition similar to those prevailing between the Congo and Katanga Province. The UN Security Council approved Mali's bid for membership soon after that state gained independence in mid-June.

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